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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 15-2989 
_____________ 
 
AMARNAUTH SINGH, 
                                           Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                              Respondent 
_____________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order  
of the Board of Immigration Appeals  
(Agency No. A041-331-273) 
Immigration Judge: Honorable Leo A. Finston 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 22, 2016 
______________ 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: 23 May 2016) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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 Petitioner Amarnauth Singh is removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), as an 
alien who was convicted of a controlled substance offense after admission.  Singh applied 
for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against 
Torture.  In his application, Singh claimed that he will be persecuted in Guyana on the 
basis of his Americanization and sexual orientation.  The Immigration Judge denied 
asylum and withholding of removal after determining that Singh and his witnesses did 
not testify credibly about Singh’s sexual orientation.  The Board of Immigration Appeals 
affirmed.  In his petition for review of his final order of removal, Singh challenges only 
the Immigration Judge’s adverse credibility finding.  Because Singh challenges only the 
Immigration Judge’s credibility finding, which was a question of fact, and does not 
dispute that he is removable for being convicted of a controlled substance offense, we 
lack jurisdiction over this matter.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), (D). Accordingly, we 
will dismiss the petition for review. 
I.  
 Amarnauth Singh, a native and citizen of Guyana, was admitted into the United 
States as a conditional lawful resident on April 20, 1987.  The conditional basis for his 
admission was removed on May 30, 1989.  On January 24, 2014, Singh was convicted in 
New Jersey Superior Court, Hudson County, for possession of cocaine in violation of 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-10(a)(1).  Following his conviction, the DHS commenced 
removal proceedings against Singh by filing a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) in Immigration 
Court.  The NTA charged Singh with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), as 
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an alien who, after his admission into the United States, was convicted under a law 
relating to a controlled substance other than a single offense involving possession of 
thirty or less grams of marijuana for one’s own use.   
 Singh appeared before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) on January 14, 2015.  Through 
counsel, he admitted the factual allegations contained in the NTA.1  Singh indicated that 
he wished to avoid the consequences of his conviction and would pursue an application 
for asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(“INA”), as well as protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  Singh 
submitted his application on March 16, 2015, claiming he would be mistreated in his 
home country on account of his Americanization and his sexual orientation as a bisexual 
or homosexual male.  In support of his application, Singh submitted a personal statement, 
statements from his ex-wife and his aunt, and an excerpt from a report on human rights in 
Guyana. 
 On April 27, 2015, the IJ held a hearing and heard testimony from Singh, Singh’s 
aunt, and Singh’s ex-wife.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the IJ denied the application 
after finding “that [Singh] and his two witnesses were not credible, with respect to the 
essential element of the claim, that being that [Singh] is homosexual or bisexual.”  App. 
37.  The IJ also determined that Singh failed to adduce any objective evidence to support 
                                              
1 Singh also acknowledged that he was ineligible to seek cancellation of removal 
under the INA because he was previously granted cancellation of removal on January 28, 
2008.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(c)(6) (explaining that aliens are ineligible for cancellation of 
removal after their removal has previously been cancelled). 
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his subjective fear of being persecuted due to his Americanization.  App. 39.  Singh 
appealed the IJ’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (the “Board”).  On July 
30, 2015, the Board dismissed Singh’s appeal, finding no clear error in the IJ’s 
determination that Singh did not present credible testimony in support of his claim 
because the IJ “identified specific, cogent inconsistencies in [Singh’s] internal testimony 
as well as inconsistencies between his testimony and that of his witnesses.”  App. 3 
(citing, inter alia, Xie v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 239, 243 (3d Cir. 2004)).   
 This petition for review followed.  
II.  
  The Government argues that we lack jurisdiction over this petition for review.  
“We review questions of our own jurisdiction de novo.”  Castro v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 
671 F.3d 356, 364 (3d Cir. 2012). We have previously held that “we lack jurisdiction to 
review factual findings underlying a removal order against an alien who has committed a 
controlled substance offense.”  Green v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 694 F.3d 503, 506 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).2  Here, Singh does not dispute, and did not dispute on 
administrative appeal, the finding that he is removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), 
for violating a law relating to a controlled substance.  As a result, our jurisdiction is 
                                              
2 Generally, we have jurisdiction to review the Board’s final order denying relief 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  Even so, in cases involving certain categories of criminal 
aliens—including aliens, like Singh, who are removable due to controlled substance 
offenses under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)—Congress has directed that “no court shall have 
jurisdiction to review any final order of removal.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).  
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restricted pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), such that we cannot review the factual 
findings underlying Singh’s removal order.  
 Because we cannot review the factual findings underlying the removal order, our 
review is limited to “constitutional claims or questions of law[.]”  8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(2)(D).  “Recognizing this statutory limitation, we have repeatedly stated that 
‘[w]e do not have jurisdiction to ascertain whether [a] factual finding was supported by 
substantial evidence.’”  Green, 694 F.3d at 507 (quoting Santos–Reyes v. Att’y Gen. of 
the U.S., 660 F.3d 196, 200 (3d Cir. 2011)).  Notably, we have held that “credibility 
determinations are factual matters” and “reversible only if ‘any reasonable adjudicator 
would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”  Jishiashvili v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 
402 F.3d 386, 392 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).  
 Here, Singh challenges only the IJ’s credibility determination with respect to his 
ex-wife’s testimony, which is a factual matter; he does not raise a constitutional claim or 
a question of law.  Cf.  Kamara v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 420 F.3d 202, 211 (3d Cir. 
2005) (explaining we retain jurisdiction to review “issues of application of law to fact,” 
but only “where the facts are undisputed and not the subject of challenge” (emphasis 
added) (quoting Bakhritger v. Elwood, 360 F.3d 414, 420 (3d Cir. 2014))).  Because 
Singh’s challenge to the adverse credibility finding is a question of fact, we lack 
jurisdiction to review it under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) and (D).  Accordingly, we will 
dismiss this petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. 
III.  
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 For the reasons set forth herein, we will dismiss the petition for review. 
